By 2026, analysts converge on a structural up‑shift in power demand, led by AI/data centers and electrification, forcing a multi‑year build‑out in generation (renewables, gas, nuclear), grids, storage and related equipment Barclays p.37–38; Goldman p.9, p.48; Brookfield p.7, p.12; UBS p.18–19]. US data centers alone are seen rising from roughly 3–4% of power demand today to ~8–9% by 2030–35 Goldman p.45; UBS p.18], with some US estimates as high as 15–20% of today's demand by 2030 BlackRock p.9]. This tightens electricity markets, lifts grid capex (e.g., ~USD 500bn global grid investment in 2026 UBS p.19]) and creates bottlenecks in equipment and permitting BofA p.7; BlackRock p.9; Brookfield p.7].
On commodities, the dominant 2026 playbook is bullish gold and industrial metals, cautious‑to‑neutral oil, constructive natural gas, and broad upside for energy‑transition materials. Gold targets cluster around ~USD 4,300–4,500/oz by end‑2026 Goldman p.5; BofA p.19; UBS p.60]; copper is seen above USD 13,000/mt on widening deficits UBS p.19], while multiple houses see structurally stronger gas prices via LNG KKR p.70–71; Goldman p.45].
Equity expression is more divided: UBS, HSBC and T. Rowe are overweight/constructive utilities and power infrastructure as direct AI beneficiaries UBS p.26; HSBC p.7, p.11–12; T. Rowe p.17], whereas Goldman and BofA flag utility balance‑sheet stress and policy risk and lean cautious tactically Goldman p.26; BofA p.20]. All agree private capital (infrastructure and private credit) will be central to funding the energy‑power build‑out BlackRock p.9, p.13; Brookfield p.5, p.28–30; JPAM p.6, p.24–25; T. Rowe p.12–13].
Secular shift in OECD power demand. JPAM highlights a break from two decades of near‑zero demand: OECD power demand is expected to grow 2–4% annually from 2025 into the 2040s, with US load accelerating from 0.4% to 1.7–3.2% CAGR JPAM p.25]. Drivers include AI/data centers, industrial onshoring, and EVs.
AI/data centers as primary marginal load. BlackRock calls energy "the real constraint" on AI, with DCs potentially using 15–20% (up to 25%) of current US demand by 2030 BlackRock p.9]. Goldman sees DC power demand up 175%+ by 2030 Goldman p.9]. UBS notes US DC share rising from 0.7% (2015) → 3.2% (2024) → 8.6% (2035E) and DCs adding Sweden‑sized annual load by 2030 UBS p.18]. Brookfield shows US DC demand forecasts jumping 36% in seven months Brookfield p.12].
Grid constraints & capex. Brookfield describes power as "the bottleneck to growth," with >70% of transmission lines >25 years and interconnection queues "close to a decade," implying >$600bn/yr grid investment by 2030 Brookfield p.7, p.11]. UBS sees ~USD 500bn global grid investment in 2026 UBS p.19]. BofA highlights three‑year backlogs for HV equipment and politically sensitive local opposition to new data‑center loads BofA p.7]. BlackRock and Goldman both stress permitting delays as key US/EU choke points BlackRock p.9–10; Goldman p.37–38].
Renewables + storage as the first responder. Barclays notes solar and wind are now the cheapest new electricity in almost all major markets, with renewables >30% of global generation in 2024 and solar additions exceeding coal, gas and nuclear combined Barclays p.37]. Goldman emphasizes renewables & storage as the quickest to deploy to meet AI demand (best‑case online by ~2026) vs gas CCGT (~2029) and nuclear (>2030) Goldman p.48]. Brookfield expects solar/wind to provide almost 20% of global electricity by 2026, nearly 5x a decade ago Brookfield p.13], with batteries central to turning them into round‑the‑clock power Brookfield p.14]. UBS ties renewables and grid modernization to >USD 2.1tr in 2024 energy‑transition investment UBS p.19].
Gas and LNG as critical, increasingly scarce marginal supply. KKR argues US gas is transitioning from a shale‑era USD 3.5/MMBtu regime to a USD 4–5/MMBtu equilibrium as LNG exports surge (LNG rising to 31% of US gas demand by 2032 KKR p.70]) and higher‑cost basins set marginal supply KKR p.70–71]. Goldman expects continued momentum in US LNG exports to Europe and Asia Goldman p.45]. Morgan Stanley leans into gas‑linked E&Ps (e.g., EQT) as a differentiated play on rising power and LNG demand MS p.60]. Brookfield calls gas with CCS a "transitional yet indispensable" source Brookfield p.15].
Nuclear: slow but gaining policy support. Barclays points to US executive orders backing advanced nuclear for defense and AI infrastructure Barclays p.24]. Brookfield expects "hundreds of GW" of new nuclear over coming decades, citing the US plan to start construction on 10 reactors by 2030 with USD 80bn initial investment Brookfield p.14]. Goldman and UBS see SMRs and nuclear as important long‑term but not material contributors before the 2030s+ Goldman p.48; UBS p.19]. HSBC flags nuclear restarts and UK‑US nuclear deals as part of the AI era energy mix HSBC p.12, p.14].
Gold – broad structural consensus, one tactical dissent.
Pro‑gold bloc: HSBC (strategic OW, central‑bank & retail buying as reserves shift from USD HSBC p.24–25]); BofA (explicit USD 4,538/oz YE‑26 target, central banks flipping from 8,100t net sellers to 8,100t net buyers 1970–2024, 830t buying pace in 2025 BofA p.10, p.19]); UBS (gold to USD 4,300/oz Dec‑26, silver to USD 57–60 UBS p.60]); Barclays (gold as preferred direct commodity exposure Barclays p.46]); Morgan Stanley (gold among best performers in the "run it hot" regime; only NDX has outperformed gold in 5 years MS p.13–14]); Stifel and JPAM treat gold as key inflation hedge Stifel p.32; JPM p.5].
Skeptic: BlackRock sees gold as tactical with idiosyncratic drivers and "skeptical of its role as a long‑term portfolio hedge" BlackRock p.8, p.15].
Industrial metals – copper and aluminum as core transition levers. UBS is most explicit: copper demand up ~3% in 2026 with deficits widening to 87kt, driving prices >USD 13,000/mt UBS p.19]; aluminum also faces shortages UBS p.34]. BofA is bullish metals, expecting aluminum/copper to "push higher in 2026" on tight supply and recovering Western demand BofA p.18]. Barclays and HSBC highlight critical‑mineral chokepoints (REEs, lithium, copper, cobalt) and China's ~60–70% share in rare earths Barclays p.23; Goldman p.45; HSBC p.13–14]. UBS adds circularity (only 6.9% of materials recycled) as a structural driver UBS p.19].
Oil – modest, range‑bound expectations. KKR and BofA both see 2026 as oversupplied, with WTI/Brent around USD 57–60 KKR p.67–68; BofA p.17–18]. UBS projects a mild recovery to Brent 67 / WTI 64 by end‑2026 UBS p.60], driven by slowing non‑OPEC supply and modest demand recovery UBS p.34]. JPM and BlackRock mainly reference low oil as a tailwind for EM/consumers, not a primary alpha source JPM p.7; BlackRock p.10].
Natural gas/LNG – one of the clearest commodity upside consensuses. KKR sees Henry Hub USD 4–5/MMBtu over the medium term as LNG exports add 18 Bcf/d by 2032 and high‑cost basins set the marginal barrel KKR p.70–71]. Goldman expects continued US LNG export growth to Europe and Asia Goldman p.45]. Morgan Stanley highlights EQT's premium‑priced sales to utilities and LNG buyers MS p.60]. Brookfield, while not pricing gas, treats gas capacity and CCS as central to an "any‑and‑all" system Brookfield p.15]. BofA and UBS both see energy as a geopolitical hedge BofA p.17–18; UBS p.34].
Utilities and core power infrastructure.
Bullish camp (utilities as structural growth + income): UBS (OW US utilities; 18% valuation discount; direct AI and industrial power demand exposure UBS p.26]); HSBC (OW utilities as AI/power winners HSBC p.7, p.11–12]); JPAM (energy utilities "most direct and immediate beneficiaries" of three‑E cycle JPAM p.27]); T. Rowe (real‑assets equities benefiting from AI‑driven energy demand T. Rowe p.17]); Brookfield (utilities and grid companies central to once‑in‑a‑generation infra "supercycle" Brookfield p.5, p.7, p.11–15]).
Cautious camp (fundamental strain): Goldman sees utility capex for grids/renewables/data centers outpacing operating cash flow and is cautious on utility credit Goldman p.26]. BofA underweights utilities despite AI demand, citing poor near‑term EPS growth, elevated valuations and policy risk around IRA‑style support BofA p.20–21].
Energy producers & midstream. Morgan Stanley, KKR and UBS are more constructive on selected E&Ps, LNG/Midstream and service names as beneficiaries of gas/LNG demand, higher power loads and the inflationary regime MS p.39–41, p.60; KKR p.25, p.70–71; UBS p.34]. JPM is more cautious on energy equities given low oil prices JPM p.7].
Infrastructure and private markets. BlackRock, Brookfield and JPAM stress listed and private infrastructure as under‑owned and undervalued relative to the scale of required investment (BlackRock: infra EV/EBITDA at a 20–30% discount to global equities BlackRock p.13]; Brookfield: >USD 100trn infra needs by 2040 Brookfield p.5]; JPAM: infra capex finally exceeding depreciation, ushering in a structural growth phase JPAM p.24–25]). T. Rowe and JPM note that hyperscaler and AI infra capex is partly shifting value from public to private markets in data centers and associated power TRowe p.12–13; JPM p.10].
"Run it hot" / financial repression regime. Morgan Stanley, BofA, UBS, Barclays and Stifel all see high debt/deficits and policy choices leading to structurally higher nominal growth and periodic inflation, which is supportive of real assets, commodities and gold versus long‑duration bonds and pure growth equities MS p.11–13; BofA p.2, p.17; UBS p.36–38; Barclays p.29, p.46; Stifel p.38–40].
Stifel's commodity‑cycle lens. Stifel treats 2025–2035 as a new commodity up‑cycle from a long‑term low, historically associated with populism and conflict, favoring Value, small‑caps and non‑US vs Growth and US Big Tech Stifel p.41–42]. They stress that a genuine AI productivity boom would likely come with higher oil vs gold (reflation), not disinflation Stifel p.32].
Across houses, 2026 is framed as the early innings of a multi‑decade power and infrastructure super‑cycle: AI/data‑center loads and electrification are driving grids, renewables, gas, nuclear and critical‑mineral demand into structural deficit space, with utilities/infrastructure, LNG‑linked gas, copper/aluminum and gold the clearest investable beneficiaries JPAM p.24–27; Brookfield p.5–7, p.12–15; UBS p.18–19, p.33–34]. The investable edge lies not in broad commodity beta but in owning the constrained nodes of the system—grids, firm power, critical materials and gold—while being selective on oil and leveraged utilities, given divergent views on their pricing power and balance‑sheet risk Goldman p.26; BofA p.17–20].
| Source | Content |
|---|---|
| Goldman Outlook - Summary | AI hyperscaler and data center buildout is a major driver of rising power and infrastructure capex, with data center power demand explicitly cited as a key factor pushing utilities’ capex above operating cash flow into 2026 and beyond [p.16–17]. Hyperscaler AI capex already accounts for ~27% of S&P 500 capex and is “projected to rapidly ascend,” raising the risk of eventual overinvestment and weaker returns on assets [p.3–4][p.16–17]. |
| Barclays Outlook | AI infrastructure expansion is “amplifying global energy demand” and is expected to put “much pressure on electricity prices,” with data centres alone projected to consume nearly 4% of global electricity by 2030, making power costs a meaningful constraint for users despite electricity being just 2.6% of the US CPI basket [p.6, p.17, p.37]. Elevated AI- and data-centre-driven demand is embedded in the 2026 macro outlook and underpins the case for sustained investment in generation and grids [p.6, p.17, p.36–37]. |
| Brookfield Outlook | AI and data centers are identified as the fastest‑growing source of electricity demand, with AI workloads using up to 10x more power per rack than conventional compute and potentially another 5–10x increase as density rises, contributing to a multi‑decade structural surge in electricity demand [pp.5–6, 11–13]. U.S. data center power demand is forecast at 106 GW by 2035, a 36% upward revision in just seven months, and power is explicitly described as “the bottleneck to growth” and “the most significant gating requirement” for AI and broader economic development [pp.11–12]. Electricity demand growth is projected out to 2050, with data centers contributing ~17% of incremental demand over 2025–2050 [p.12]. |
| Goldman Outlook | Data demand from AI and non‑AI sources is expected to catalyze “generational” growth in global power demand, with data center power use forecast to rise 175%+ by 2030 vs 2023 and US data centers’ share of power consumption increasing from 3% to 8% by 2030 [p.9, p.45]. Speed to power is described as “paramount” for hyperscalers, implying power availability is a binding constraint that must be solved via rapid generation and grid build‑out [p.9, p.37]. |
| Blackrock Outlook | AI and other data centers could consume 15–20% of current U.S. electricity demand by 2030, with some estimates as high as 25%, creating a load that will “test the limits of power grid, fossil and materials industries” and collide with grid‑connection backlogs and slow permitting [p.9]. Power and land, rather than chips, are identified as the real binding constraints on AI infrastructure, to the point that data‑center capex plans may need to be “walked back” if bottlenecks intensify [p.9]. China is highlighted as having structural power-supply advantages for AI due to rapid buildout of generation and transmission and cheap domestic solar and batteries [p.9]. |
| JPM Outlook | AI/data‑center investment is driving a substantial physical build‑out, with data‑center capex already at ~1.2–1.3% of GDP and “continued investment growth…expected,” implying structurally rising power demand through at least 2025–26 [p.3]. A “supply crunch on power or critical materials” is flagged as a key downside risk that could interrupt the AI boom and broader market advance, indicating power availability is a potential binding constraint rather than an afterthought [p.4]. |
| KKR 2026 Outlook | AI training clusters and data centers massively increase power-adjacent loads, with each AI cluster needing on the order of 100–200 chillers versus 2–4 for a traditional high‑rise office, contributing to a “sustained upcycle” in electrical/HVAC capex and equipment shortages [p.18–19, p.23]. Tightness is most evident in shortages of transformers, switchgear, electrical components, and skilled labor [p.18–19, p.23, p.26]. |
| JPAM Outlook | OECD power demand is expected to grow 2%–4% annually from 2025 into the 2040s, with U.S. load moving from a 0.4% historical CAGR to 1.7%–3.2% and Europe around 2% per year, driven by AI/data centers, “electronification of everything,” and industrial onshoring adding heavy loads to grids designed for residential demand [p.3, p.12, p.25]. Hyperscalers’ data‑center capex is increasingly financed in private markets alongside the “power grids that fuel them,” and energy availability is becoming a binding constraint and key differentiator for industrial and data‑center real estate, with high‑power buildings in short supply and outperforming in returns [p.6, p.12–13]. Long‑term demand risk is acknowledged if AI/data‑center build‑out slows, but the multi‑decade load‑growth impulse is framed as durable [p.27]. |
| HSBC Outlook | Exponential AI and cloud adoption in the US turns electricity into a key bottleneck, as rapid data-centre buildout pushes power demand higher and requires rapid investment in generation and networks [p.3, p.12]. Asia Pacific is projected to be the fastest-growing data-centre region with 13.1% capacity CAGR in 2025–2030 (vs 9.2% North America, 5.3% Europe), with installed capacity in Asia Pacific and China reaching 2.6–2.8x 2020 levels by 2030, implying substantial regional power-load growth [p.9–10]. Utilities and power infrastructure are positioned as primary beneficiaries of this multi‑year demand shock [p.3, p.7, p.11–12]. |
| MS - 2026 US Equities Outlook - The Rolling Recovery Is Here | AI capex is driving structurally higher demand for compute and “subsequently power,” with the “race to acquire power” intensifying and making “time to power” solutions a key investment theme into 2026 [p.15]. Natural gas turbines, Bloom Energy fuel cells, nuclear, and crypto‑to‑data‑center conversions are highlighted as attractive ways to secure rapid power access, implying power availability increasingly acts as a binding constraint for AI/data center expansion [p.15]. |
| Stifel Outlook | n.a. |
| TRowe Outlook | AI buildout is a “physical infrastructure” story in which power is a core component of the AI infrastructure stack alongside semiconductors, networking, and cloud, with data centers and utilities singled out as major capex targets [p.2, p.5, p.13]. Increased energy demand from AI is cited as a key structural driver supporting real assets and energy‑linked equities [p.17]. |
| RIC 2026 BAML | AI and data centers are driving a sharp upward revision in U.S. electricity demand, with expected power additions over the next decade rising from 182 TWh in 2021 to 803 TWh and the 10‑year demand CAGR increasing from 0.43% to 1.67% [p.7]. Power is becoming a binding constraint as the four largest high‑voltage equipment providers face about three years of backlog and local political backlash emerges against data center projects in places like Mesa (AZ), Colorado Springs (CO), and Prince William County (VA) over water, cost, and land concerns [p.7]. A slower power‑infrastructure buildout would lengthen payoffs from AI capex and depress AI equity multiples [p.7]. |
| UBS Year Ahead | Rapid AI adoption and a growing pipeline of industrial megaprojects are set to drive US electricity demand materially higher, with data centers alone projected to add as much power demand as Sweden currently consumes per year by 2030 and to rise from 3.2% of US demand in 2024 to potentially up to 9% by 2035 (8.6% in BNEF’s base case) [p.18]. Higher load growth is already feeding into a forecast 23% rise in US wholesale power prices in 2025 vs. 2024, effectively making power availability and grid capacity a key constraint and profit driver for utilities and power infrastructure [p.18]. |
| Source | Content |
|---|---|
| Goldman Outlook - Summary | Energy transition and renewables are framed as secular tailwinds for European corporates, supported by policies like the EU’s Clean Industrial Deal [p.5]. Nuclear energy is highlighted specifically in Japan as a likely fiscal beneficiary alongside defense and technology sectors under a Takaichi-led government, implying increased support for nuclear in that market [p.7]. |
| Barclays Outlook | Solar and wind are described as the cheapest sources of new power in almost all major markets, with 2024 solar additions exceeding coal, gas and nuclear combined and renewables already supplying over 30% of global electricity versus 20% five years earlier, supported by >$2 trillion of green-energy investment (roughly double fossil fuels) [p.36–37]. Advanced nuclear is being fast-tracked in the US for defence facilities and AI infrastructure, and US authorities may also intervene in traditional energy (including coal/gas) for competitiveness, implying a mixed system where renewables dominate growth but nuclear and fossil plants remain important in meeting rising demand [p.24, p.36–37]. |
| Brookfield Outlook | Future power supply is an “any‑and‑all” mix where renewables provide the lowest‑cost, fastest‑to‑deploy bulk power, batteries supply flexibility and turn renewables into round‑the‑clock solutions, nuclear offers large‑scale, carbon‑free baseload, and natural gas (increasingly with CCS) serves as a critical transitional and indispensable stabilizer [pp.11, 13–15]. Solar and wind are expected to reach almost 20% of global electricity by 2026 and to dominate new capacity additions, batteries have seen ~95% cost declines since 2016 and are often paired with solar, hundreds of gigawatts of new nuclear are deemed necessary over coming decades (including U.S. plans for 10 new reactors by 2030 with at least $80B of investment), and gas with CCS (e.g., Entropy’s Glacier plant) is presented as a viable path to decarbonized thermal power [pp.13–15]. [p.?] |
| Goldman Outlook | Rising demand is expected to be met by a wide mix of traditional and sustainable sources, with an emphasis on distributed generation, reliable/dispatchable supply, and demand flexibility [p.37]. Renewables plus storage are described as the quickest option to meet AI power demand, with best‑case deployment around 2026 and already accounting for over 90% of new US capacity in early 2025 [p.48–49]; gas combined‑cycle additions are constrained by turbine availability with best‑case timing around 2029, while nuclear is limited by permitting and construction with best‑case online dates in 2030–2035+ and thus positioned as a long‑horizon solution [p.48]. US LNG export growth is expected as Europe shifts to friendly gas supply and Asia away from coal, indicating gas remains important in the transition; coal is only mentioned as the “dirtier” source being reduced [p.45]. |
| Blackrock Outlook | China’s power mix is described as expanding “at pace,” with on‑time, on‑budget nuclear reactors plus coal, hydropower and renewables, alongside low‑cost domestic solar and batteries that suit power‑intensive data centers [p.9]. In Europe, policy supports accelerated clean‑energy deployment via regulations to reduce permitting times for clean energy projects [p.10]. Overall emphasis is on diverse, large‑scale generation (including fossil) as a competitive advantage for meeting AI‑driven demand rather than on precise mix projections. |
| JPM Outlook | n.a. |
| KKR 2026 Outlook | Spain’s power system has “mostly decoupled” from fossil fuels, yielding some of the cheapest wholesale electricity prices in Europe and underscoring the benefits of renewables/nuclear in the mix [p.40]. Natural gas (via LNG) is positioned as a key growth fuel with Henry Hub expected at $4–5/MMBtu over the medium term and substantial U.S. Gulf Coast liquefaction buildout [p.25, p.40, p.70–71]. |
| JPAM Outlook | Power‑mix discussion centers on domestic renewables as among the “most viable and cost‑effective ways to add capacity closer to home” to meet rising demand and energy‑security needs, with net‑zero targets still a policy priority despite some softening of emissions reporting rules [p.26]. Fossil fuels (especially gas and oil) are referenced mainly via seaborne trade volumes and Europe’s historic reliance on imported fossil energy [p.26, p.32]. |
| HSBC Outlook | Global renewable electricity capacity growth is forecast to roughly double by 2030, with total installed renewables to rise by 4,600 GW by 2030 and solar PV accounting for about four‑fifths of this increase, making solar the primary marginal source of new power [p.13–14]. Power needs from AI computing particularly favour nuclear (including innovative small reactors) and large-scale renewables plus storage, with UK–US nuclear deals and nuclear restarts backed by long‑term power contracts with Big Tech [p.12, p.14]. |
| MS - 2026 US Equities Outlook - The Rolling Recovery Is Here | Natural gas turbines, Bloom Energy fuel cells, nuclear, and crypto‑to‑data‑center conversions are singled out as preferred “time to power” technologies to meet accelerating AI‑driven demand, with gas and nuclear in particular positioned as key incremental power sources [p.15]. EQT is cited as a beneficiary of rising gas demand from LNG and power generation, reinforcing the role of gas in the future power mix [p.15, p.60]. |
| Stifel Outlook | n.a. |
| TRowe Outlook | n.a. |
| RIC 2026 BAML | Nuclear is viewed structurally positively, with Japan restarting reactors and EU defense spending of ~3.5% of GDP including nuclear capabilities, and uranium/nuclear‑linked assets (URA ETF) highlighted as a favored theme [p.3, p.10, p.14]. Renewables and broader green themes face policy risk from potential phaseout or rollback of IRA‑style incentives (“Big Beautiful Bill”) [p.20]. |
| UBS Year Ahead | Clean energy and electrification remain central, with large and rising global energy-transition investment (USD 2.1tr in 2024, +11% y/y) supporting renewables and related metals demand through 2030, while small modular reactors are acknowledged as a potential nuclear technology but are “unlikely to be a material revenue driver before the mid‑2030s,” implying a limited role in meeting near‑term AI‑driven demand [p.19, p.34]. The emphasis on electrification, grids, and energy-transition metals implies a continued tilt toward low‑carbon technologies in accommodating new load [p.19, p.34]. |
| Source | Content |
|---|---|
| Goldman Outlook - Summary | n.a. |
| Barclays Outlook | Grid infrastructure, energy storage and digital networks are identified as the “backbone of the Electrotech economy,” with grid-scale battery storage capacity more than doubling (+113%) in 2024 to 126 GW and digitalised grids enabling much more flexible power flows, but requiring sustained capital to reinforce the system [p.37–39]. A global infrastructure need of $65 trillion for 2025–2040 versus $54 trillion on current trends implies an $11 trillion shortfall that includes energy and grid assets, underscoring large capex requirements [p.29, p.39]. |
| Brookfield Outlook | Over 70% of global transmission lines are more than 25 years old and interconnection queues for new renewables are “close to a decade,” making the grid the central bottleneck to integrating new demand and supply [p.7]. Annual grid investment needs to exceed $600B by 2030 (vs $390B in 2024) to replace aging assets, integrate renewables, and ensure reliability, with grid modernization and transmission upgrades highlighted as among the strongest investment opportunities [pp.7, 15]. Batteries are described as now “central” to grid stability and to delivering round‑the‑clock power from wind and solar, with rapidly rising global storage capacity and over half of U.S. utility‑scale storage by 2026 paired with solar [p.14]. |
| Goldman Outlook | Global power demand and electrification “necessitate” major grid enhancements, with the US grid’s ~40‑year average asset age creating a structural mismatch with modern AI‑driven load and implying substantial grid capex needs [p.9, p.37]. Renewables and storage are paired as key, fast‑deploying solutions to meet AI power demand, but deployment is constrained by supply chains, turbine/nuclear bottlenecks, and especially labor, as renewables are >2.5x more labor‑intensive than fossil fuels and US/EU power sectors need 750,000+ new workers by 2030 amid an aging workforce [p.48]. Physical climate risks and high disaster recovery costs (nearly $1 trillion in a year) further raise the need for resilience, storage, and grid hardening investments [p.46–47, p.49]. |
| Blackrock Outlook | Power systems and grids are identified as key chokepoints where constraints will “bite the most,” with a backlog of projects waiting to connect to the electric grid and generally slow permitting in Western markets [p.9]. AI‑driven demand growth is “sure to test the limits of power grid” infrastructure and requires large, multi‑year investment [p.9]. China is contrasted as rapidly building transmission alongside generation, underscoring transmission buildout as part of the constraint set [p.9]. |
| JPM Outlook | n.a. |
| KKR 2026 Outlook | System bottlenecks appear mainly in shortages of electrical equipment (transformers, switchgear, components) and skilled labor, linked to “Security of Everything” and AI/data center infrastructure, implying elevated and sustained capex into power systems [p.18–19, p.23]. |
| JPAM Outlook | Core power infrastructure is entering a regime where capital expenditure materially outpaces depreciation “for the first time this century,” reflecting the need to expand and modernize grids and transmission to handle rising loads, energy security and transition demands [p.24–26]. System bottlenecks include long permitting timelines, supply‑chain constraints and limited existing capacity, which increase the value of incumbent assets and create execution/labor and safety risks at the project level [p.27]. The focus is on grid interconnections, transmission upgrades and localized generation rather than specific storage technologies or capex numbers [p.26–27]. |
| HSBC Outlook | Electricity supply and networks form one of two key bottlenecks in the US AI/building‑boom narrative, requiring rapid capex to expand generation and grid capacity as demand accelerates [p.3, p.12]. Energy storage is projected to grow at a 23% CAGR in GW terms to 2035, providing backup and addressing interruption risks in main utility power, especially as renewables and AI‑related loads increase [p.13–14]. Onsite generation and storage adoption (with US survey showing 38% of firms targeting some onsite and 27% targeting 100% onsite generation by 2030) highlight pressure on existing systems and a push toward more resilient power architectures [p.14]. |
| MS - 2026 US Equities Outlook - The Rolling Recovery Is Here | n.a. |
| Stifel Outlook | n.a. |
| TRowe Outlook | n.a. |
| RIC 2026 BAML | Grid and equipment constraints are material, with the four largest high‑voltage electrical equipment providers carrying around three years of backlog in 2024, pointing to limited near‑term ability to expand transmission and substation capacity [p.7]. AI‑driven load growth and associated increases in grid electricity prices raise the risk of political backlash and delays or cancellations for power‑intensive projects, effectively bottlenecking system expansion [p.7]. |
| UBS Year Ahead | Global grid investment is projected to reach around USD 500bn in 2026, underpinned by AI‑driven demand growth and policy support (EU Green Deal, China’s Five Year Plan, and selective US measures), signaling substantial capex needs for modernization and expansion [p.19]. AI‑enabled grid management and broader electrification reinforce the need to upgrade aging infrastructure and improve resilience, while circular-economy solutions and recycling are viewed as essential to mitigate material supply risks tied to this buildout [p.19]. |
| Source | Content |
|---|---|
| Goldman Outlook - Summary | Utilities are viewed as balance-sheet stressed rather than pure beneficiaries, as capex for grid modernization, renewables, and data center power demand exceeds operating cash flow for most issuers and underpins a cautious credit outlook on the sector into 2026 [p.16]. Rising power demand from AI/data centers creates revenue opportunities but simultaneously pressures leverage and ratings risk. |
| Barclays Outlook | Listed energy companies are highlighted for high total shareholder yield (dividends plus buybacks), contributing to the attractiveness of markets such as the UK that have significant energy exposure and elevated dividend yields, positioning energy-linked corporates as income-generating beneficiaries as the cycle matures [p.15–16]. |
| Brookfield Outlook | Utility‑led grid modernization and transmission capex programs are presented as attractive, regulated, inflation‑linked investment opportunities, implicitly positioning utilities as beneficiaries of the required spending rather than balance‑sheet casualties [p.7]. Corporates increasingly bypass utilities via direct clean power contracts (especially hyperscalers, which account for ~90% of global clean energy contracting for data centers), creating a growing private/merchant layer on top of regulated systems and expanding opportunities for power‑sector corporates that can provide dedicated generation [p.12]. |
| Goldman Outlook | Utility issuers face elevated capex demands for grid modernization, renewables build‑out, and data center‑driven load that are outpacing operating cash flow, leading to a cautious sector outlook and implying balance sheet stress rather than straightforward benefit [p.26]. Higher real rates and large, long‑dated project pipelines compound the financing pressure, even as utilities sit at the center of the power‑demand and transition investment themes [p.6, p.13, p.26]. |
| Blackrock Outlook | European utilities are seen as beneficiaries of the political focus on energy, as elevated power prices, energy security concerns, looser fiscal rules, and regulation to speed clean‑energy permitting support increased energy investment and sector profitability [p.10]. In regional equity tilts, utilities are favored in Europe, and power‑generation companies are liked in China, tying them to AI and energy‑transition themes rather than highlighting balance‑sheet stress from capex [p.14, p.16]. Broader comments on infrastructure suggest regulated, long‑lived utility‑type assets enjoy defensive cash flows and attractive valuations [p.13]. |
| JPM Outlook | Utilities are identified as AI “enablers,” with AI beneficiaries expected to “broaden out from the innovators (tech) to the enablers (industrials, utilities) and the adopters (financials, health care),” implying utilities stand to benefit from AI‑driven power infrastructure demand rather than being framed as balance‑sheet stressed by capex [p.7]. Traditional energy equities, by contrast, may struggle due to “low oil prices” [p.7]. |
| KKR 2026 Outlook | n.a. |
| JPAM Outlook | Energy utilities that own generation, transmission and distribution are identified as the most direct and immediate beneficiaries of the new power‑demand and capex cycle, expected to earn higher, inflation‑linked returns driven by genuine demand growth and capital scarcity rather than increased risk or leverage [p.24–25, p.27]. Vertically integrated utilities with strong balance sheets and supportive regulators are best positioned to finance and execute the required capex while maintaining defensive characteristics, with new heavy‑industrial and hyperscaler customers providing stable, long‑term load [p.27]. Balance‑sheet stress is acknowledged implicitly via project‑level execution and affordability risks but is not presented as the central narrative for the sector [p.27]. |
| HSBC Outlook | Utilities are overweight in the equity allocation as direct beneficiaries of accelerating electricity demand from AI and data centres, with multi‑year power‑supply agreements from Big Tech underpinning long‑term capacity additions, including nuclear restarts [p.7, p.11–12]. Utilities and power‑infrastructure developers are expected to gain from the need to resolve electricity bottlenecks via significant capex, with the sector also framed as a source of stable, inflation‑linked cash flows and income [p.3, p.6–7]. |
| MS - 2026 US Equities Outlook - The Rolling Recovery Is Here | Utilities and power names like AES, NEE, TLN, and VST are identified as AI “Enabler/Adopter” stocks with “High” pricing power and Overweight ratings, indicating they are key beneficiaries of rising AI‑related power demand rather than being framed as balance‑sheet stressed [p.42]. These names are positioned within the powering‑GenAI theme, tied to intensifying demand for power solutions [p.15, p.42]. |
| Stifel Outlook | n.a. |
| TRowe Outlook | Utilities are identified as key beneficiaries of AI‑related infrastructure demand, featuring as major users of private credit to fund the “physical and digital backbone” of growth, including power for data centers [p.13]. |
| RIC 2026 BAML | Utilities are characterized as AI beneficiaries with growing power demand from data centers, stable fundamentals, and defensive, inflation‑protected income that could attract a future rotation from short‑duration funds [p.20]. The sector is rated Underweight due to poor next‑12‑month EPS growth relative to recent multiple expansion and policy risk to renewables/green themes from potential IRA phaseouts [p.20–21]. |
| UBS Year Ahead | US utilities are seen as clear beneficiaries of AI‑driven power demand and industrial manufacturing, with rising capital investment in power infrastructure supporting robust earnings growth rather than unduly stressing balance sheets [p.26]. The sector trades at an 18% discount to the S&P 500 with a 2.7% dividend yield, offering a “compelling combination” of growth and defensive income, and is explicitly favored as an equity sector to play power‑and‑resources themes [p.26–27]. |
| Source | Content |
|---|---|
| Goldman Outlook - Summary | AI-related hyperscalers have begun issuing substantial debt to finance rising AI and infrastructure capex, linking private and corporate credit markets to power and data center buildout, and raising concerns about potential overinvestment and return-on-asset pressure [p.16–17]. Broader themes of infrastructure investment—in Europe via defense and infrastructure spending and in the GCC via digitalization and infrastructure—are framed as equity and credit opportunities [p.5][p.8]. |
| Barclays Outlook | Private infrastructure is expected to grow strongly as a response to a projected $11 trillion global infrastructure investment shortfall (2025–2040), with energy, grid and digital networks singled out as key areas needing capital and offering resilient, inflation-hedged income with equity-like upside and diversification benefits [p.29, p.39]. The 2026 environment is framed as a “buyer’s market” for private assets, making energy-transition and power-linked infrastructure particularly attractive to private credit and equity investors [p.25, p.29, p.39]. |
| Brookfield Outlook | Private capital is described as essential to scaling the “any‑and‑all” power solution, with infrastructure and power systems at the center of a >$100T global infrastructure need by 2040 and $3.3T of power investment in 2025 (over 60% into renewables, storage, and grids) [pp.5, 12–13]. Grid modernization, transmission, renewables, storage, nuclear, and decarbonized gas are all framed as core private infrastructure opportunities, while infrastructure debt and real estate credit (especially for data centers and energy infrastructure) provide inflation‑linked, resilient yields with historically low default and high recovery characteristics [pp.7, 28–31]. Emerging markets’ underinvestment (only ~20% of power capex despite fastest demand growth) is highlighted as a large opportunity set for private financing of low‑cost renewables and grid projects [p.13]. |
| Goldman Outlook | An estimated $12 trillion of energy transition capital demand by 2030 and broad infrastructure needs (generation, grids, storage, resiliency, distributed assets) create substantial opportunity for private capital in infrastructure, sustainable private credit, and green bonds [p.9, p.37, p.47–48]. Middle‑market infrastructure is highlighted as relatively attractively valued (lower EV/EBITDA multiples than large‑cap) and well placed to deploy into grids, distributed generation, circular economy, and logistics assets, while sustainable private credit in energy transition is described as offering an attractive risk‑return profile amid enduring capital scarcity [p.37, p.47]. |
| Blackrock Outlook | Private capital is described as central to bridging the gap between current energy supply and future demand because elevated public debt constrains government spending on power systems, grids and related infrastructure [p.7, p.9]. Infrastructure assets—including energy, digital and utility systems—are seen as indispensable beneficiaries of AI and the energy transition, with listed infrastructure trading at a deep EV/EBITDA discount to global equities, creating an “attractive” strategic entry point [p.13, p.15]. Private infrastructure and infrastructure debt (both IG and sub‑IG) are highlighted for access to hard‑to‑find assets (e.g., CCS, biofuels) and for defensive, often inflation‑linked cash flows [p.13]. |
| JPM Outlook | Massive hyperscaler spending on AI is described as a “transfer of value from the public to the private markets,” with private equity, infrastructure and private credit funds “key players behind the build‑out of data centers and their associated infrastructure,” underscoring the importance of private capital in funding power‑linked digital infrastructure [p.10]. Commodities and private alternatives are also grouped with gold and TIPS as inflation‑hedged assets, suggesting some portfolio appeal for real‑asset exposures in an inflation scenario [p.5]. |
| KKR 2026 Outlook | Energy infrastructure, LNG, and power‑adjacent capex (HVAC, electrical equipment, data center infrastructure) are framed as structural multi‑year opportunities, favoring private capital allocations into collateral‑based, inflation‑resilient cash flows such as LNG infrastructure and high‑quality real estate credit [p.8, p.18–19, p.23–26]. There is a clear positive stance on private investment in power‑linked assets [p.8, p.18–19, p.23–26]. |
| JPAM Outlook | Private equity, infrastructure and private credit are increasingly financing data centers and the power grids that supply them, as hyperscalers’ capex has shifted value toward private markets [p.6]. Core infrastructure (especially power utilities and grids) is framed as entering a structural growth phase where capital scarcity and regulated, inflation‑linked cash flows can support higher returns without higher risk, making power‑linked assets attractive long‑term holdings for private capital [p.24–27]. Energy‑linked real assets (e.g., high‑power industrial real estate, maritime energy logistics) are also highlighted as beneficiaries of the same demand and capex trends [p.12–13, p.32–34]. |
| HSBC Outlook | Infrastructure, including energy and power assets, is highlighted as attractive for its stable, inflation‑linked cash flows and strong demand for infrastructure funding, positioning it as a favoured income and partial inflation‑hedge allocation [p.6–7, p.13–14]. Multi‑year need for infrastructure capex tied to AI‑driven power demand and the energy transition implies ongoing opportunities for private capital in power, grids and storage [p.3, p.13–14]. |
| MS - 2026 US Equities Outlook - The Rolling Recovery Is Here | Private markets have amassed $4.2T of dry powder, or about $8T of buying power with leverage, supporting a favorable backdrop for large‑scale capex, infrastructure, and M&A that would include power and energy assets [p.57]. The scale of available private capital is presented as a key enabler for infrastructure and corporate activity through 2027 [p.56–57]. |
| Stifel Outlook | n.a. |
| TRowe Outlook | Private credit and private markets are described as critical in financing AI‑related infrastructure, with projects such as data centers and utilities contributing to a “huge demand for private credit solutions” and a roughly USD 1.2 trillion financing gap relative to PE dry powder and traditional lending channels [p.12–13]. This positions power‑linked assets as attractive opportunities for private lenders, as they fund the energy and infrastructure backbone of AI growth. |
| RIC 2026 BAML | n.a. |
| UBS Year Ahead | Power and resources are framed as a core structural investment theme, with investors encouraged to use regional and sectoral diversification to capture opportunities in grid modernization, renewables, and critical materials, implying significant space for infrastructure and private‑market capital to participate [p.19, p.21]. Power‑linked assets (utilities, commodities, and related equities) are positioned as attractive ways to gain exposure to these long‑term trends [p.26–27, p.33–34]. |
| Source | Content |
|---|---|
| Goldman Outlook - Summary | China’s use of rare earth export controls is flagged as a strategic risk weighing on EU manufacturing and competitiveness, particularly for tech and industrial sectors that depend on these critical materials [p.18]. Lower oil prices are treated as a macro tailwind for EM assets and EM monetary easing rather than as a security concern [p.7][p.14]. |
| Barclays Outlook | Critical minerals and rare earths are treated as strategic chokepoints, with China controlling ~70% of rare-earth output and using export curbs as leverage, while the US builds a vertically integrated “mine-to-magnet” ecosystem via equity stakes in MP Materials, Lithium Americas and Trilogy Metals to secure supply for AI, EVs and defence [p.8, p.22–23]. Gold is the preferred direct commodity exposure despite record prices, valued as a risk-mitigating asset and diversifier from the US dollar [p.46]. |
| Brookfield Outlook | n.a. |
| Goldman Outlook | Economic and resource security is framed as a durable theme, with vulnerability highlighted from China’s ~60% share of rare earth production and Taiwan’s ~90% share of leading‑edge semiconductor manufacturing, pushing governments and corporates to prioritize supply chain resilience and energy/resource independence [p.45]. Continued momentum in US LNG exports is expected as Europe seeks supply from “friendly” producers and Asia reduces coal use, underscoring LNG’s role as a strategic fuel in the transition [p.45]. Gold is mentioned as having surpassed $4,000/oz in October 2025 and oil as having moved lower to ease EM inflation [p.5, p.24]. |
| Blackrock Outlook | Critical minerals are singled out alongside power systems and grids as key bottlenecks and opportunity areas in meeting AI‑driven energy demand [p.9]. Gold has seen revived investor interest as a hedge now that long‑duration Treasuries provide less ballast, but is characterized as a tactical play with idiosyncratic drivers rather than a strategic, long‑term portfolio hedge [p.8, p.15]. Broader energy‑security concerns are highlighted for Europe via elevated power prices and import dependence [p.10]. |
| JPM Outlook | Resource constraints appear via the risk of a “supply crunch on…critical materials” as a potential trigger for an AI/market downturn [p.4]. Low oil prices are cited as a headwind for energy equities [p.7], while gold and commodities are framed mainly as inflation‑hedging tools within portfolios (“inflation‑hedged assets like gold, commodities and private alternatives”) [p.5]. |
| KKR 2026 Outlook | Energy security is central to the broader “Security of Everything” theme, with natural gas/LNG highlighted as a strategic growth area driven by U.S. Gulf Coast liquefaction and rising export demand, and oil seen as oversupplied near term but still structurally needed under the IEA’s Current Policies Scenario through 2050 [p.18–19, p.25, p.67–71]. Defense and re‑armament trends in Europe and NATO reinforce the strategic importance of secure energy supply chains [p.18–19, p.42]. |
| JPAM Outlook | n.a. |
| HSBC Outlook | Energy security is framed as a core theme, with rare earths and critical minerals flagged as strategic bottlenecks for wind, solar and storage given highly concentrated supply and rising trade/geopolitical risks, reinforcing the need for diversification of sources [p.13–14]. Gold is overweight as a strategic portfolio diversifier and quasi‑reserve asset, with its share in global reserves rising since 2022 while the USD share declines and central banks/retail investors remain net buyers [p.5–6, p.24–25]. PGMs are noted as volatile industrial metals with some demand upside but weaker diversification benefits than gold [p.25]. |
| MS - 2026 US Equities Outlook - The Rolling Recovery Is Here | Natural gas and LNG are framed as strategic via EQT’s “differentiated exposure to rising demand from LNG and Power” and premium‑priced gas sales to utilities, aligning gas with structural power and export demand [p.60]. Gold (and crypto) is treated as a core inflation hedge and store of value in a “run it hot” regime—only the NDX has outperformed gold over the last 5 years, and the S&P 500 in gold terms trades 70% below tech‑bubble highs, underscoring gold’s strategic role in portfolios [p.13–14, p.18]. |
| Stifel Outlook | Commodities are framed as entering a multi‑year upswing from a long-term low, historically associated with populism, conflict, and investor‑unfriendly regimes, with particular focus on gold and oil as macro indicators rather than on LNG or specific critical minerals [p.32, p.38, p.41–42]. Gold and Bitcoin are treated as liquidity and risk-on/off indicators, and the oil‑to‑gold ratio is linked to productivity and reflation, implying that higher oil prices would accompany any genuine growth/productivity surge and thus carry strategic macro significance [p.29, p.32]. |
| TRowe Outlook | n.a. |
| RIC 2026 BAML | Gold is treated as a strategic asset and “best hedge against anarchy and inflation,” with structural bullishness driven by fiscal deficits, heterodox policy, and sustained central‑bank buying (1970–2004 sales of ~8,100 tons versus 2004–2024 purchases of ~8,100 tons, and 2025 buying pace of 830 tons), alongside a 2026 year‑end target of $4,538/oz [p.10, p.17, p.19]. Industrial/critical metals such as copper and aluminum are favored on tight supply and prospective demand from green capex, re‑industrialization, and AI‑related electrification, with expectations they “push higher” in 2026 if Western demand rebounds and China stabilizes [p.18, p.20]. Oil is seen as structurally oversupplied, with Brent and WTI projected to average $60/bbl and $57/bbl in 2026 and downside risks from weaker Chinese strategic buying or a Ukraine peace deal vs upside risks from sanctions and geopolitical disruptions [p.17–18]. |
| UBS Year Ahead | Critical minerals—especially copper and aluminum—are treated as strategic assets, with demand driven by clean energy and electrification, structural deficits projected in 2026, and a call for greater circularity as material use has tripled over five decades while only 6.9% is recycled [p.19, p.34]. Gold is highlighted as a strategic hedge supported by central bank buying, large fiscal deficits, and geopolitical risk, warranting up to 5% of portfolio assets, while oil is seen as an energy‑transition laggard that nonetheless offers cyclical upside from mid‑2026 and acts as a hedge against Middle East geopolitical shocks [p.33–34, p.50, p.60]. |
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