2026 is framed across houses as a structurally more protectionist, "multipolar" regime where US–China rivalry, elevated tariffs and national‑security‑driven industrial policy rewire supply chains rather than collapse trade. Barclays, Goldman, KKR, UBS, BlackRock and others all describe tariffs and export controls as persistent but managed shocks—adding inflation and volatility yet not, in base cases, causing recession Barclays p.4–6; Goldman p.6; KKR p.27–29; UBS p.10–11, p.48]. Effective US tariff rates sit in the mid‑teens to high‑teens (Goldman ~18% Goldman p.6]; KKR base‑case 15% with ~13% realized KKR p.27, p.32]), and court rulings could affect ~70% of tariff revenue UBS p.46]. NATO‑linked defense targets of ~5% of GDP by 2035 and EU/German packages (Germany ~€80–100bn in 2026; "over 20% of GDP" in infra/defense over time) anchor a multi‑year fiscal‑industrial build‑out in Europe BlackRock p.10; Goldman p.9, p.14; UBS p.27]. The consensus investable narrative: "economic/security of everything" (defense, energy & grids, AI/semis, critical minerals) and North American/European re‑industrialisation are durable capex engines, while classic export‑led European manufacturing and globally exposed tech/consumer names face sustained margin and policy risk Barclays p.22–24; HSBC p.11–14; Goldman p.19, p.28; KKR p.18–19, p.41–42].
Across houses, 2026 sits in a new regime where tariffs in the mid‑teens, NATO‑style defense targets near 5% of GDP and multi‑hundred‑billion fiscal/industrial packages (e.g., Germany's €80bn+ in 2026; US OBBBA's $200–300bn impulse) entrench "economic security" and partial reshoring as core macro drivers rather than transient shocks Goldman p.6, p.9, p.14; T. Rowe p.8; UBS p.27; KKR p.27, p.29]. For investors, that argues for structurally overweighting defense, energy and grid infrastructure, critical minerals/semis, and real‑asset platforms leveraged to reshoring and intra‑Asia trade, while being selective in export‑heavy European manufacturing and globally exposed tech/consumer names that sit on the wrong side of this security‑first world.
| Source | Content |
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| Goldman Outlook - Summary | A more multipolar global structure is described, with greater geopolitical fragmentation and less synchronized markets, creating both risks and a wider set of equity opportunities heading into 2026 and beyond [p.2][p.5]. Geopolitical conflicts in the Middle East and rising national/economic security priorities in Europe are treated as part of a structural backdrop rather than transient shocks [p.2][p.8]. Fragmentation is also visible in FX and capital flows, with US policy uncertainty and deficits driving notable USD depreciation and divergent returns in Euro terms [p.5]. |
| Brookfield Outlook | Deglobalization is a structural, long‑term “megatrend” that is “redrawing the geography of economic activity” and has evolved into a “systemic restructuring of energy, manufacturing and logistics ecosystems,” expected to drive investment “for decades to come” [p.2, p.5–7]. Geopolitical volatility is a key driver of corporate decisions on where to manufacture, store and distribute goods, reinforcing the permanence of regionalization and trade clustering [p.24]. |
| Blackrock Outlook | A “third distinct world order” since WWII is underway as the U.S. resets economic and geopolitical relationships toward transactional trade, industrial policy and a reset of alliances, a “decisive break from the post‑Cold War order” and clearly structural rather than cyclical. U.S.–China rivalry is described as the “defining feature of geopolitics,” spanning trade, technology, energy and defense, with both sides seeking to reduce “strategic dependencies that can be weaponized,” implying a durable, broad-scope fragmentation centered on AI and tech decoupling. [p.10] |
| Goldman Outlook | Geopolitical dynamics reflect a structural shift toward economic security, with decoupling forces between the US and China “continu[ing] to outweigh” those favoring tighter integration, indicating a durable fragmentation backdrop rather than a temporary shock [p.6, p.9]. This decoupling interacts with broader security themes (defense, energy, supply chains) that are expected to shape policy and capital deployment through 2026 and beyond [p.9, p.45]. |
| Barclays Outlook | A shift to an “increasingly multipolar” world where “the US and China decouple” is framed as a structural, long‑term regime change, with reintegration “increasingly unviable” and separation “inevitable” [p.4], [p.22]. Trade tensions, export controls and techno‑nationalism are persistent features shaping supply chains, growth models (notably China’s move up the value chain), and investment strategies [p.7–8], [p.22], [p.25]. These dynamics are expected to endure over many years, embedding geopolitical fragmentation into the macro backdrop rather than remaining a transient shock [p.8], [p.22–24]. |
| JPM Outlook | n.a. |
| JPAM Outlook | Rising nationalism and geopolitical tensions are structurally reshaping industrial geography and investment, prompting onshoring of critical sectors such as AI, chips, pharma, aerospace, and defense [p.9, p.12]. Global trade is being re-routed and fragmented rather than collapsing, with longer, more complex routes and “China+1” diversification in APAC indicating a durable shift in how globalization functions rather than a full reversal [p.14, p.20, p.33]. These dynamics are framed as multi‑year to multi‑decade themes intertwined with energy security and industrial policy [p.12–14, p.25–26]. |
| HSBC Outlook | Geopolitical tensions and US–China trade frictions are treated as a persistent but manageable backdrop, with a current “US trade truce” de‑escalating near‑term risks and supporting CNY and Asian assets [p.5, p.9–10, p.25]. Fragmentation has driven structural responses such as strategic autonomy in supply chains, tech and defence in both the US and China, implying a multi‑year rather than cyclical shift in the policy environment [p.3, p.6, p.17–18]. Trade tensions are framed more as sources of recurrent volatility than as a structural break that ends the cycle [p.3–5]. |
| KKR 2026 Outlook | Geopolitics and national security are treated as a structural “Regime Change,” with national security now overlapping trade, capital, technology, and data, making geopolitics a persistent macro driver rather than background noise [p.10, p.14, p.16]. Great‑power competition (U.S.–China, intra‑Asia reconfiguration) and the associated “Security of Everything” theme are framed as secular, decade‑scale forces that reshape trade patterns and capital allocation but do not imply outright deglobalization [p.18–20, p.42]. Intra‑Asia trade rising toward 68% of regional trade by 2030 and China’s move up the value chain in direct competition with Germany underscore that fragmentation is about rewiring and regionalization rather than collapse of global trade [p.20, p.42]. |
| RIC 2026 BAML | Global “rebalancing” away from a hyper‑strong US dollar and extreme US asset concentration is a secular H2‑2020s theme driven by policymakers seeking self‑reliance and stability, implying a partial structural break from the prior “just own US tech & Treasuries” regime rather than a short‑lived shock [p.1–3, p.17]. US–China relations sit in a “trade truce” but ongoing “tech war,” shaping allocations (e.g., long China on tech advancement) and interacting with de‑dollarization and diversified growth outside the US [p.3, p.17]. |
| MS - 2026 US Equities Outlook - The Rolling Recovery Is Here | Multipolarity and trade tension with China create a higher-friction but more stable backdrop in the base case, where trade “settle[s] in a de-escalatory steady state” and a multipolar world is described as a structural positive for US Industrials and reshoring rather than a disruptive break [p.22, p.33–34]. US industrial stagnation since China’s WTO entry is presented as a long structural phase that is now starting to reverse, implying a durable shift toward domestic/region-for-region production with success still uncertain [p.11, p.34]. Geopolitical tensions are also cited as a driver for hedging via gold/crypto and for elevated macro uncertainty, mainly via the inflation/Fed channel [p.13, p.23]. |
| Stifel Outlook | Trade war and broader geopolitical conflicts (Ukraine/Russia, Iran/Israel+US, potential Korea/DPRK and Taiwan/PRC flashpoints) are framed as features of a renewed, long‑lasting populist/conflict regime tied to a commodity upturn that is structurally unfriendly to high‑P/E, growth‑led markets, rather than a short, one‑off shock. [p.38–p.42] |
| TRowe Outlook | Trade tensions, especially involving China, are a persistent structural uncertainty alongside the war in Ukraine, with global trading relationships further complicated by China’s “anti‑involution” campaign that raises prices of commonly exported goods [p.2, p.4]. The global trading system has so far been “reasonably adaptable” to tariffs, but the ultimate impact on emerging markets and the durability of this adaptation are framed as multi‑year and uncertain [p.4–5]. |
| UBS Year Ahead | Deglobalization and geopolitics—specifically clashes between rising and established powers and cycles of integration/fragmentation—are a powerful, persistent force that now actively shapes markets and fuels volatility, but in the base case they remain a manageable backdrop within a “solid growth” outlook rather than a systemic break [p.10–11, p.48]. US–China rivalry intensified in 2025 and is expected to involve further brinkmanship, yet so far escalations around trade and technology have ended in negotiated outcomes thanks to mutual incentives to avoid prolonged disruption [p.47]. |
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| Goldman Outlook - Summary | A new US tariff regime effective April 2 is highlighted as a key inflection point that shifted relative performance back in favor of US equities via an AI-driven surge, underscoring tariffs as a meaningful macro and market catalyst [p.5]. Potential re-escalation in tariff rhetoric toward China is flagged as a risk that has historically caused sharp reversals in China’s flow-driven rallies [p.10]. |
| Brookfield Outlook | n.a. |
| Blackrock Outlook | |
| Goldman Outlook | US effective tariffs are about 18%, the highest burden on consumers since 1934, following an “April tariff shock” partially offset by trade deals with the UK, EU, Japan and progress with India and China [p.6]. Tariffs are currently treated by markets as a one‑off upward shift in prices, with corporate mitigation via supply‑chain changes and selective price increases, but still pose downside risk to 2026 growth if pass‑through to consumer prices increases, though not yet as a persistent inflation regime shift [p.6]. |
| Barclays Outlook | US has implemented “the stiffest tariff hikes since the Great Depression,” including “reciprocal tariffs” generating ~US$300bn per year, which are expected to lift consumer prices and contribute to sticky inflation and complicate bond and credit markets [p.5–6], [p.19], [p.21], [p.28]. These tariffs also weigh on euro area growth as US–EU trade frictions intensify, with 2026 singled out as a year when tariff impacts on Europe’s growth‑inflation mix become more visible [p.9–10]. Legal risks to the US tariff regime (likely Supreme Court challenge) make the current structure durable in its protectionist intent but potentially unstable in its exact form [p.6]. |
| JPM Outlook | Dramatic increases in U.S. tariffs generate “very significant” revenue, averaging over USD 29bn between June and October, initially absorbed by retailers but increasingly passed through to consumers from late 2025 into 2026, boosting inflation and dragging on real consumer spending through 1H26 before fading as a macro force if tariff levels stay unchanged [p.3]. A potential Supreme Court ruling invalidating certain tariffs could cut revenue and require refunds to firms, marginally lifting 2026 growth and lowering inflation, while possible “tariff rebate checks” would recycle revenues to households, raising both growth and inflation later in 2026 [p.4]. Tariffs also weigh on international exporters’ earnings (Europe, Japan) in 2025, with “less tariff uncertainty” in 2026 expected to support non‑U.S. earnings [p.8]. |
| JPAM Outlook | Tariffs are significant but manageable shocks that reconfigure trade flows rather than destroy them, with “logistics in a tariff world” seeing trade volumes rise as firms frontload goods and reorganize procurement, particularly toward domestic sources in the US [p.18]. In timber, an executive order designating wood imports a national security threat leads to blanket tariffs from 14 Oct 2025 and, combined with earlier duties, brings Canadian lumber to ~45% average trade taxes, materially raising US prices and supporting domestic producers [p.42]. US tariffs have had minimal impact on APAC industrial real estate because intra‑APAC trade exceeds 50% of total and US‑bound trade is a relatively small share, limiting regional macro drag [p.19–20]. |
| HSBC Outlook | Tariff shocks such as “Liberation Day” have produced short‑term volatility and front‑loaded imports but did not reverse US asset inflows or meaningfully damage margins, as many firms passed costs onto customers [p.4–5]. Trade tensions, tariff threats and geopolitical worries remain ongoing headwinds, especially for EM, but are not seen as cycle‑ending given resilient growth and earnings; recent US trade deals and a trade truce with China have eased some uncertainty [p.5, p.8–9, p.22, p.25]. Possible tariff refunds via Supreme Court decisions are cited as a potential positive for corporates, underscoring that the macro impact of past tariffs has been more modest than feared [p.4]. |
| KKR 2026 Outlook | U.S. effective tariff rate is modeled at 15% in 2026 (realized ~13% after substitution), with a long‑run convergence to low‑mid‑teens, bracketed by a 9% low case and 23% high case, making tariffs a persistent “negative supply shock” rather than a temporary spike [p.27, p.32–33]. Tariffs subtract roughly 0.5 pp from 2026 GDP growth but their drag is offset by fiscal stimulus (OBBBA), while 2026 is identified as the peak year for tariff‑driven input cost and inflation impact, increasingly spilling from goods into services (e.g., healthcare) [p.29, p.32, p.37–38]. Legal and political uncertainty (IEEPA challenges, use of Section 122/301) shapes the risk range around this structurally higher tariff regime [p.33, p.37–38]. |
| RIC 2026 BAML | Tariffs are estimated to have added roughly 0.5pp to US inflation, with trade policy and tariff uncertainty interacting with Fed cuts and longer‑term yields, indicating a non‑trivial, persistent macro influence rather than a one‑off shock [p.15]. Sector views incorporate tariff sensitivity, with tech portrayed as the biggest victim of de‑globalization and tariffs, and consumer/industrial sectors flagged for tariff and immigration‑policy risk; USMCA renegotiation in mid‑2026 is highlighted as a key trade‑regime event for Mexico and North American supply chains [p.17, p.20–21]. |
| MS - 2026 US Equities Outlook - The Rolling Recovery Is Here | Tariffs are framed as the primary policy tool to rebalance the current account deficit (‑4.4% of GDP) and limit consumption, with “meaningful tariff revenues” already being collected and the rate-of-change shock viewed as largely behind, as costs are now shared across exporters, importers and consumers [p.9]. Macro impact is two-sided: in the bull case, a stable tariff regime delivers muted macro drag and even pricing power for some goods producers, while in the bear case, tariff‑induced goods inflation becomes a key driver of a renewed inflation impulse that forces Fed tightening and equity multiple compression [p.22–23]. Tariffs are treated as durable “background” policy, with future decisions (e.g., IEEPA tariffs) still a meaningful risk factor [p.9]. |
| Stifel Outlook | A “tariff pivot in April 2025” is described as a meaningful macro shock that contributed to a “bear trap,” with tariffs treated as a headwind that nonetheless does not fully offset the roughly +50 bps GDP boost from the 2025 tax law through mid‑2026. Tariffs generated a one‑off manufacturing “pre‑buy pop” in ISM new orders and inventories, followed by a lack of restocking and no sustained uplift in manufacturing momentum. [p.1][p.5][p.27] |
| TRowe Outlook | Tariffs are labeled an “inflationary” policy that makes it harder for developed‑market central banks—especially the Fed—to return inflation to target and constrains the scale of rate cuts in 2026 [p.2–3, p.14]. Front‑loading of European exports ahead of U.S. tariffs in 2025 is expected to drain eurozone manufacturing demand in 2026, contributing to weaker growth and a more dovish ECB stance [p.3–4]. The global trading system has adapted reasonably well so far, but the long‑term growth and fiscal effects of tariffs, particularly on emerging markets, are explicitly uncertain and may take years to fully emerge [p.4–5, p.18]. |
| UBS Year Ahead | US effective tariff rates are elevated in historical context, with tariffs contributing to a period of US growth softness in early 2026 and pushing inflation to a peak just over 3%, constraining the Fed’s scope to cut rates [p.10–11, p.22–23]. Around 70% of tariff revenue is exposed to a Supreme Court ruling on IEEPA, implying significant legal uncertainty, and a key risk is that second‑round price effects from tariffs make inflation more persistent and long‑term yields higher, even if any overturned tariffs are replaced with more targeted measures [p.46–47]. In scenario terms, US tariffs in the base case remain “in the high teens,” fall below 10% in a bullish “tech boom” case, and are associated with disruptive inflation and easing in a bearish case, underscoring both the durability and conditionality of the tariff regime [p.48]. |
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| Goldman Outlook - Summary | Europe is portrayed as undergoing reindustrialization, with increased fiscal flexibility (e.g., Germany easing its debt brake) and formal programs like the EU’s Clean Industrial Deal and the European Defence Industry Programme aimed at boosting infrastructure, defense, and industrial capacity and narrowing the growth gap with the US in 2026 and beyond [p.5]. These initiatives are framed as part of a broader national and economic security push, channeling spending into energy transition, infrastructure, and manufacturing sectors [p.2][p.5]. |
| Brookfield Outlook | Industrial policies in the U.S. and Western Europe are “accelerating the repatriation of semiconductor, pharmaceutical and advanced manufacturing capacity,” supported by “trillions of dollars of public and private capital,” with reshoring of strategic sectors framed as a core channel of reindustrialization [p.6–7]. U.S. manufacturing construction spending rising from $72B in 2018 to $232B in 2024 (42% CAGR 2021–24) is linked to deglobalization and reshoring, illustrating the scale of the reindustrialization push [p.19]. Long‑term, scale private capital is portrayed as essential to implement these policies via infrastructure‑style manufacturing platforms and full‑supply‑chain investments [p.6–7]. |
| Blackrock Outlook | Industrial policy is central to the new order, with Europe loosening fiscal rules to boost energy investment and using new regulation to promote competition and shorten permitting for clean-energy projects, aiming to address vulnerability from elevated power prices and import dependence. The EU’s embrace of parts of the Draghi report and Germany’s suspension of its “debt brake” to raise defense and infrastructure spend illustrate large-scale, security-oriented industrial and reindustrialisation efforts. [p.10] |
| Goldman Outlook | Economic security–driven industrial policy underpins reindustrialization in the US and Europe, with North America seeing about $1.7tn in announced manufacturing mega‑projects since January 2021 and Europe rolling out the EU Clean Industrial Deal and European Defence Industry Programme to support domestic growth, infrastructure, and energy transition [p.19, p.45]. Germany’s 2026 fiscal package of more than €80bn (~1.8% of GDP vs 2024) aimed at defense, infrastructure and energy, alongside broader EU programs, is expected to narrow the growth gap with the US, though execution risk is flagged after two decades of underinvestment [p.9, p.14, p.19]. |
| Barclays Outlook | US is building a “government‑industrial complex” to drive re‑industrialisation via tariffs, direct equity stakes, guarantees and stockpiling in critical minerals and semiconductors, crowding in large private capital commitments and signalling a serious, multi‑year reshoring drive [p.22–24]. Germany plans to raise public spending by 2.2% of GDP by 2027 and deploy ~€500bn over 12 years for infrastructure and defence‑linked investment, with defence above 1% of GDP exempt from deficit rules, though political and fiscal constraints temper speed and effectiveness [p.9–10]. Industrial policy is embedded in a broader regime of techno‑nationalism and transactional diplomacy, shaping domestic, “tariff‑proof” business models and near‑shoring‑driven infrastructure investment [p.25], [p.29]. |
| JPM Outlook | Fiscal and tax policies such as OBBBA function as de facto U.S. industrial policy by providing full expensing of equipment and R&D, plus capex and bonus‑depreciation provisions that improve free cash flow for R&D‑intensive (tech, health care) and capital‑intensive (industrials, energy) firms, potentially inducing more domestic investment [p.3, p.6]. In Europe, large government investment programs, particularly in Germany, and strong growth in eurozone nominal government investment (14.4% annually in 2022–26 vs 1.3% in 2010–19) support a manufacturing upturn as projects are executed [p.9]. |
| JPAM Outlook | Industrial policy in the US and Europe is channeling large-scale capital into domestic manufacturing of batteries, semiconductors, rare earths, and other critical sectors, reversing decades of offshoring that produced 5bn sq ft of warehouses but only 350m sq ft of manufacturing since 2001 in the US [p.12–13]. Flagship projects like Intel’s EUR30bn Magdeburg chip plant and France’s battery buildout, supported by EU initiatives such as REPowerEU to double renewable generation by 2030, exemplify targeted reshoring aimed at technological and energy self‑reliance [p.13]. High‑power industrial assets show clear performance benefits (8% vs <3% returns for lower‑power space), suggesting these policies are already altering real asset demand and returns [p.13]. |
| HSBC Outlook | US re‑industrialisation and onshoring are described as a structural, strategic goal underpinned by tariffs, tax incentives (e.g. 100% bonus depreciation via the OBBB Act) and tariff‑exemption deals tied to US investment commitments, driving a powerful capex cycle into advanced manufacturing and data centres [p.3, p.17–18]. Global investment in advanced manufacturing facilities surged from USD 2.5bn to USD 32.5bn YoY, with North American re‑industrialisation highlighted as a high‑conviction theme, though labour and electricity bottlenecks are acknowledged [p.3, p.17]. Europe is portrayed as a laggard, having implemented only 11% of Draghi’s competitiveness recommendations and suffering from high energy costs and Chinese competition, implying weaker effectiveness of its industrial‑policy response so far [p.3–4, p.20]. |
| KKR 2026 Outlook | U.S. industrial policy is centered on OBBBA, a roughly $1.89 trillion package with ~two‑thirds deployed by 2029 that adds ~0.5 pp to 2026 GDP via tax cuts, refunds (~$125bn in early‑2025), and incentives supporting AI capex and household demand, effectively offsetting tariff drag [p.29, p.32, p.49]. Reindustrialisation and reshoring in the U.S. and Europe are constrained by severe skilled‑labor shortages—68% of industrial/manufacturing firms cite availability of qualified workers as a major concern—amid very low U.S. public spending on active labor market policies (34th of 35 OECD countries), implying that private‑sector training must carry much of the burden [p.16–17]. European industrial policy is also channeled through climate measures (ETS2), where delay from 2027 to 2028 is used to balance green goals against industrial competitiveness by limiting near‑term energy and carbon‑cost shocks [p.40–41, p.43]. |
| RIC 2026 BAML | United States policies are turning toward rebuilding the industrial base in advanced manufacturing, shipbuilding, and defense technology, underpinning the “American Industrial Renaissance” and reshoring theme captured by the AIRR ETF, which has returned 18%/ann. vs 14%/ann. for the Russell 3000 since 2012 [p.3, p.10]. Europe and Japan are also raising defense and infrastructure spending, with these industrial/infra pushes treated as core mechanisms of global rebalancing and a multi‑year capex cycle benefiting Industrials via reshoring, automation, and replacement of an aged capital stock [p.3, p.20]. |
| MS - 2026 US Equities Outlook - The Rolling Recovery Is Here | US industrial policy is centered on the One Big Beautiful Bill (OBBBA), which uses upfront R&D expensing and restoration of 100% first-year bonus depreciation (vs a prior 40% schedule in 2025) to materially lower near-term cash tax rates and incentivize large-scale capex, particularly in capital‑intensive sectors like Aerospace & Defense, Telecom, Tech, Energy and Capital Goods [p.20]. This push is part of a broader rebalancing away from consumption and toward domestic investment in energy, manufacturing efficiency (robotics), healthcare, education and workforce re‑tooling, with success acknowledged as uncertain but structurally supportive for US reindustrialisation and reshoring [p.9–11, p.33–34]. Effectiveness is inferred from the expected pickup in equipment investment and industrial outperformance, contingent on private capital seeing adequate ROIC, as investment will stop if returns disappoint [p.13, p.20, p.33–34]. |
| Stifel Outlook | n.a. |
| TRowe Outlook | U.S. industrial policy is anchored in the “One Big Beautiful Bill Act” (OBBBA), which provides substantial capex incentives and a net fiscal impulse of roughly USD 200–300 billion in FY 2026 focused on physical infrastructure, energy grids, roads, bridges, data centers, and industrial capacity, reinforcing a broad reindustrialization and AI‑infrastructure capex cycle [p.3, p.8–9, p.14–15]. Expansionary fiscal policy in the U.S. (projected increase in fiscal spending of 23% of GDP over 10 years) and in Europe (including Germany’s large fiscal expansion) is presented as structurally supportive of industrials, materials, energy, and value sectors, with re‑shoring and deregulation cited as key supports for value and small‑caps [p.3–4, p.8–9, p.15, p.17]. |
| UBS Year Ahead | Industrial and fiscal policy is skewed toward infrastructure, grids, clean energy, and strategic sectors, with the EU Green Deal and China’s Five Year Plan channelling “hundreds of billions” of dollars into grid modernization and industrial upgrades and Germany planning to invest over 20% of GDP in infrastructure and defense, supporting capex and growth [p.19, p.27]. In the US, remaining elements of the Inflation Reduction Act now coexist with the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law and the “One Big Beautiful Bill (OBBB) Act,” which provides fresh tax incentives and deregulation (especially for banks), creating a more mixed but still supportive backdrop for private investment and capacity expansion [p.19, p.25]. The emphasis on infrastructure, security, and technology points to policy‑driven reinforcement of domestic and strategic production capabilities rather than laissez‑faire globalization [p.19, p.23, p.25]. |
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| Goldman Outlook - Summary | A renewed focus on national and economic security in Europe is driving higher infrastructure and defense spending, supported by loosened fiscal constraints such as Germany’s eased debt brake, with these outlays expected to support growth and re-rate sectors like defense, utilities, and financials [p.2][p.5]. Japanese policy under Takaichi is also expected to favor defense and nuclear energy via pledged investments, positioning these areas as structural beneficiaries of fiscal policy [p.7]. Defense and security-related spending are clearly identified as long-term capex engines. |
| Brookfield Outlook | n.a. |
| Blackrock Outlook | NATO allies have agreed to target defense spending of 5% of GDP by 2035, up from a previous 2% benchmark, signaling a major, long-lived increase in defense outlays that acts as a structural capex engine, especially in Europe. Germany has suspended its debt brake to raise defense and infrastructure spending, and “hefty defense spending” is expected to create medium‑term opportunities in European defense tech, underscoring the link between geopolitical fragmentation and sustained security-related investment. [p.10] |
| Goldman Outlook | NATO members’ aim to reach defense spending of about 5% of GDP by 2035 and the EU’s “ReArm Europe Plan 2030” with roughly €800bn of incremental defense spend anchor a long‑term defense capex upcycle that has turned Europe’s defense sector from sluggish and undervalued into one of its fastest‑growing areas [p.9, p.45]. Germany’s additional ~€80bn spending in 2026 and broader economic‑security‑oriented outlays (defense, energy, infrastructure) across developed markets are portrayed as durable engines of capital deployment and growth, albeit with associated fiscal‑sustainability risks [p.6–7, p.9, p.14, p.19]. |
| Barclays Outlook | Germany’s plan effectively carves out defence spending above 1% of GDP from deficit limits, enabling a sizeable, long‑duration defence‑linked capex programme within a ~€500bn infrastructure envelope to 2037 [p.9]. In the US, national security concerns over rare earths, semiconductors and AI infrastructure underpin equity stakes, guarantees and an executive order to accelerate advanced nuclear for defence and AI‑related power needs, positioning defence and economic security as core capex engines [p.22–24]. These commitments are long‑term. |
| JPM Outlook | Several European countries, led by Germany, pledge to spend around 5% of GDP on defense and infrastructure, with spending starting to occur in 2026 and focused on domestic procurement that benefits European defense “champions” trading at discounts to U.S. peers [p.9]. Eurozone government investment growth averaging 14.4% annually in 2022–26 vs 1.3% in 2010–19 underscores defense/infrastructure as a major capex engine, potentially sustaining a multi‑year upturn in European manufacturing and defense sectors [p.9]. |
| JPAM Outlook | Defense and economic security spending is a key capex engine, with the US “One Big Beautiful Bill Act” expected to add ~1 percentage point to 2026 GDP via tax cuts and higher defense and critical industry investment [p.11]. European policymakers are pushing for materially higher defense outlays, with some advocating up to 5% of GDP and Germany pairing increased defense budgets with infrastructure investment, embedding security considerations into long‑run capital spending [p.11]. |
| HSBC Outlook | Aerospace, defence and security are in a “renaissance,” with Western governments aiming to lift defence spending to around 5% of GDP in the medium term, creating a substantial and durable capex engine [p.11–12]. Rising perceived geopolitical risks and the growing economic cost of cyber‑attacks (USD 1.2–1.5trn in 2025) underpin long‑term investment in conventional defence, space, and cyber‑security capabilities [p.11–12]. |
| KKR 2026 Outlook | Global military expenditure reached $2.72tn in 2024 (+9.4% real YoY), with NATO members and Canada boosting defense spending by 22% in real terms between 2022 and 2025, anchoring “Security of Everything” as a multi‑year capex engine [p.18–19]. Germany plans a 70% increase in defense spending to €162bn by 2029, the EU is loosening budget rules to support rearmament, and European defense procurement is roughly 52% intra‑Europe and 34% from the U.S., embedding defense in Europe’s broader capex cycle beyond the immediate Ukraine conflict [p.18, p.42–43]. Defense, alongside energy security and AI/cyber infrastructure, is explicitly framed as a durable growth driver rather than a one‑off response [p.18–19]. |
| RIC 2026 BAML | EU plans to spend 3.5% of GDP on defense and Europe/Japan are raising defense and infrastructure outlays, positioning security spending as a structural, multi‑year capex engine within the broader global rebalancing narrative [p.3]. A US defense upcycle is cited as a key driver for Materials (notably copper and aluminum) and for Industrials tied to defense technology, integrating defense budgets directly into sector and commodity demand outlooks [p.20]. |
| MS - 2026 US Equities Outlook - The Rolling Recovery Is Here | Defense and security-related industrials (Aerospace & Defense) are highlighted as key beneficiaries of OBBBA’s capex-friendly tax treatment and of the multipolar, reshoring-driven industrial cycle, implying a structural capex tailwind for the sector [p.20, p.33–35]. US A&D is presented as a prime capex and industrial-policy winner [p.20, p.33–35]. |
| Stifel Outlook | n.a. |
| TRowe Outlook | Rising global defense spending, together with a multiyear commercial aircraft backlog and travel recovery, underpins a strong outlook for aerospace and defense as a relatively rate‑insensitive, multi‑year capex engine [p.9]. Suspension of Germany’s debt brake is explicitly linked to increased fiscal flexibility for defense and infrastructure, contributing to higher bund yields and signaling a durable European defense and security investment push [p.4, p.9]. |
| UBS Year Ahead | Rising defense and security spending is one of the structural drivers pushing G7 debt from 85% two decades ago to 126% in 2025 and a projected 137% of GDP by 2030, indicating that defense outlays are becoming a semi‑permanent component of elevated public expenditure and thus a long‑term demand engine [p.36–37]. Germany’s plan to invest over 20% of GDP in infrastructure and defense exemplifies how security needs are translating into substantial capex, with implications for European growth and sectoral opportunities (e.g., industrials, utilities) [p.27–28]. The analysis links heightened security concerns, ongoing regional conflicts, and the need for military readiness to sustained, rather than cyclical, defense spending [p.33–34, p.36–37]. |
| Source | Content |
|---|---|
| Goldman Outlook - Summary | Chinese rare earth export controls are explicitly cited as exacerbating pressure on eurozone tech and manufacturing by reinforcing the competitiveness of Chinese exporters and weighing on EU manufacturing [p.18]. Semiconductors and AI are treated as strategic technologies, with Taiwan’s TSMC dominating sub‑10nm chip manufacturing and planning about $165 billion of advanced semiconductor investment in the US, and Japanese policy targeting AI, semiconductors, quantum, space, advanced medicine, and cybersecurity as strategic sectors [p.7][p.8]. |
| Brookfield Outlook | n.a. |
| Blackrock Outlook | U.S.–China competition is said to center on AI as “the key technology determining future economic and military advantage this century,” with both powers making “major efforts to curb strategic dependencies that can be weaponized,” implying the use of technology and resource dependencies as policy levers. [p.10] |
| Goldman Outlook | Supply risk from concentration in critical inputs is highlighted, with China producing about 60% of global rare earths and Taiwan manufacturing roughly 90% of leading‑edge semiconductors used for AI, reinforcing policy pushes for resource and tech security [p.45]. Rare earth export controls are an active lever in US–China relations (with Trump–Xi talks covering tariffs and rare earth controls), and TSMC’s planned ~$165bn US investment in advanced fabs exemplifies efforts to localize or friend‑shore strategic semiconductor capacity [p.6, p.20, p.45]. |
| Barclays Outlook | China’s control of ~70% of global rare earth production and use of export restrictions provide “strategic leverage” in US–China disputes, prompting the US to create a Strategic Mineral Reserve, vertically integrate “mine‑to‑magnet” supply chains and take equity stakes in MP Materials, Lithium Americas and Trilogy Metals, backed by price‑floor guarantees and long‑term offtake [p.8], [p.22–23]. Semiconductors are treated as strategic: Intel, “the only US firm capable of high‑end domestic fabrication at scale,” receives a 10% US equity stake via CHIPS funds alongside deep commercial partnerships (e.g., Nvidia’s US$5bn stock purchase) [p.23–24]. Export controls and techno‑nationalism are broader levers fragmenting trade and digital markets, reinforcing the security framing of rare earths, critical minerals and advanced chips [p.22–25]. |
| JPM Outlook | n.a. |
| JPAM Outlook | Critical resources and strategic technologies such as semiconductors, batteries, and rare earths are central to national self‑reliance strategies, with the US and Europe explicitly seeking “supply chain independence” in these areas through domestic manufacturing and high‑power industrial capacity [p.12–13]. Europe’s semiconductor ambitions (e.g., Intel Magdeburg) and China’s “Made in China 2025” and 15th Five‑Year Plan targeting technological self‑reliance highlight semiconductors and advanced manufacturing as core policy levers [p.13–14]. |
| HSBC Outlook | Energy security and AI/EV‑related electrification are driving demand for critical minerals, with rare earth export restrictions and concentrated supply among a few producers highlighting geopolitical risk and the need for diversification of critical‑mineral supply chains [p.13–14]. Clean‑energy technologies (EVs, batteries, solar) are central strategic industries, exemplified by clean energy accounting for over 10% of China’s GDP in 2024, making control of related materials and technologies a key policy lever [p.13–14]. Export controls are referenced indirectly via rare earth restrictions [p.14]. |
| KKR 2026 Outlook | National security is explicitly extended to encompass AI infrastructure, energy security, critical minerals, and related supply chains, making control over these strategic inputs a core policy lever [p.14, p.18–19]. Shortages and underinvestment in grid equipment and industrial components (e.g., transformers, switchgear) and the strategic framing of U.S. LNG exports highlight how critical‑resource and energy security concerns are driving long‑horizon capex and trade relationships [p.19, p.25, p.70–71]. Tech and data are embedded within the national‑security–trade nexus [p.10, p.16, p.18]. |
| RIC 2026 BAML | Strategic tech appears via the “US–China tech war,” with China’s technology advancement and US–China tech tensions central to the bullish stance on China and to tech’s vulnerability to de‑globalization and tariffs [p.17, p.20]. Nuclear supply‑chain assets (URA ETF, +86% YTD) and Japan’s nuclear restarts illustrate how energy‑security concerns are channeling capital into critical‑resource value chains [p.3, p.10, p.14]. |
| MS - 2026 US Equities Outlook - The Rolling Recovery Is Here | n.a. |
| Stifel Outlook | n.a. |
| TRowe Outlook | Strategic technology and supply chains center on AI‑related physical infrastructure—data centers, semiconductors, energy grids, networking, and robotics—with Japan positioned at the heart of global semiconductor and robotics supply chains and set to benefit from the ongoing capex cycle [p.2, p.6, p.9]. European industrial and automation franchises are highlighted as key players in “physical AI” (robots, autonomous systems, drones), and advances in defense technology such as AI‑powered surveillance and small modular reactors are cited as growth drivers [p.9]. |
| UBS Year Ahead | US–China competition increasingly centers on strategic technologies and inputs, with unresolved tensions around semiconductors and explicit brinkmanship risks over rare earth exports and AI chip sales, illustrating how export controls and resource leverage function as policy tools within the rivalry [p.23, p.47]. China’s latest Five Year Plan puts “technology innovation and industrial upgrades” at the core of its strategy to improve quality, security, and global competitiveness, while energy‑transition spending and grid investment (USD 2.1tr globally in 2024; ~USD 500bn grid investment in 2026) underscore the growing importance of critical materials like copper and other inputs whose supply can be geopolitically constrained [p.19, p.25, p.33–34]. These dynamics increase the risk of targeted disruptions in strategic tech and resource supply chains, though the base case still assumes negotiated outcomes rather than outright embargoes [p.47]. |
| Source | Content |
|---|---|
| Goldman Outlook - Summary | Supply-chain rewiring is implied through large-scale semiconductor FDI such as TSMC’s planned ~$165 billion in advanced manufacturing capacity in the US, effectively reshaping chip supply geography [p.8]. Emerging markets like China, India, South Korea, and Taiwan are highlighted as key nodes in global AI and chip innovation, while GCC markets (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE) remain resilient despite trade-route risks from Gaza and Red Sea tensions [p.8]. |
| Brookfield Outlook | Deglobalization is “redrawing the geography of economic activity,” driving onshoring of critical supply chains and a shift toward regionalization and “distinct trade clusters… across the Americas, Europe and Asia Pacific,” each with its own ecosystem [p.6–7, p.24]. Companies are rethinking manufacturing, storage and distribution locations “in light of geopolitical volatility,” and intra‑Asia‑Pacific container volumes are up 13% in 2024 vs. 2019, signaling regional trade deepening and Asia‑Pacific as a relative winner in intra‑regional flows [p.24]. |
| Blackrock Outlook | The rewiring of supply chains is explicitly linked to geopolitical fragmentation and is benefiting Mexico, Brazil and Vietnam, highlighting them as regional winners from near-/friend‑shoring patterns. India is characterized as “multi‑aligned” and a “connector” that can benefit structurally from fragmentation, suggesting it is positioned to capture trade and investment flows from shifting supply chains. [p.14][p.15] |
| Goldman Outlook | Tariffs and geopolitical tensions are “fundamentally reshaping” trade flows, shifting firms from pure cost‑efficiency toward shorter, more resilient supply chains, with countries realigning trade routes based on resilience and geopolitical alignment rather than just cost [p.37, p.45]. North America emerges as a notable beneficiary via $1.7tn in manufacturing mega‑projects and associated upgrades to rail, ports, airports and storage, while Europe’s reindustrialization and energy‑security push also positions it to gain from near/friend‑shoring [p.14, p.19, p.37, p.45]. |
| Barclays Outlook | China is compelled to “reshape supply chains” and move up the value chain in a less globalised, more multipolar world [p.8], while the US actively reshapes supply chains through reshoring and friend‑shoring of critical minerals and chip fabrication, supported by strategic reserves, equity stakes, and supply deals with partners such as Australia, Ukraine and Pakistan [p.22–23]. Private markets are steered toward domestically oriented or “tariff‑proof” models and infrastructure linked to near‑shoring and logistics [p.25], [p.29]. |
| JPM Outlook | Reshoring of supply chains is cited as a key catalyst generating tradeable dislocations across rates, FX and commodities [p.11]. Indirectly, reduced tariff uncertainty and sizable European and Japanese fiscal programs, including domestic‑oriented defense and infrastructure investment, position Europe and Japan as beneficiaries through a manufacturing upturn and improved exporter earnings in 2026 [p.8–9]. |
| JPAM Outlook | Supply chains are being rewired via onshoring, near‑shoring, and “China+1” strategies, with APAC economies diversifying production and trade away from the US and toward intra‑regional flows that now exceed 50% of total trade, supporting industrial real estate demand in the region [p.14, p.19–20]. In the US and Europe, reshoring of critical manufacturing and energy security investments increase demand for domestic logistics, industrial space, and infrastructure, while trade disputes and conflicts like the Red Sea crisis lengthen routes and boost required ship and aircraft capacity, indirectly benefiting transportation assets [p.12–13, p.26, p.33]. Timber trade is similarly rewired by bans and tariffs (e.g., EU–Russia, US–Canada, US–global wood imports), shifting volumes toward alternative suppliers and domestic producers [p.41–42]. |
| HSBC Outlook | Supply‑chain rewiring is most evident in North American onshoring and Asia’s role as a technology‑hardware powerhouse; companies are investing in the US to enhance supply‑chain resilience and gain tariff/tax advantages, while many Asian economies leverage low energy costs, manufacturing proximity and large digital‑user bases to host AI‑driven data centres [p.3, p.9–10, p.17–18]. Asia Pacific is projected to see data‑centre capacity grow at a 13.1% CAGR (vs 9.2% North America, 5.3% Europe) and to reach 2.6x 2020 capacity by 2030 (China 2.8x), positioning Mainland China, Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong, Japan, India, Malaysia and Indonesia as key beneficiaries of friend‑/near‑shoring and AI supply‑chain realignment [p.9–10]. Europe’s higher energy costs and slower policy execution leave it relatively disadvantaged, particularly in German manufacturing [p.20]. |
| KKR 2026 Outlook | Supply chains are portrayed as rewiring rather than retreating, with Intra‑Asia trade rising from 46% of Asian trade in 1990 to 60% in 2024 and projected 68% by 2030 as ASEAN, India, and China deepen regional links and RMB usage [p.19–20]. China is increasingly building local presence in countries like Vietnam and competing with Germany in capital goods, while Europe must absorb redirected Chinese exports, indicating that Asia (especially ASEAN/India) and defense‑linked European/U.S. industries are key regional/sectoral beneficiaries of near/friend‑shoring [p.19–20, p.41–42]. A “goods glut” from overlapping supply‑chain shifts and great‑power competition reinforces a tilt toward services and favors firms and regions that can adapt to re‑routed manufacturing flows [p.11, p.20, p.42]. |
| RIC 2026 BAML | Supply‑chain rewiring is captured mainly through the US “American reshoring” theme (AIRR ETF) and broader industrial capex, with reshoring, automation and infrastructure spend viewed as key supports for US Industrials [p.10, p.20]. Global rebalancing and a weaker dollar are expected to shift performance leadership toward EM, Europe, Japan, and commodities, while USMCA renegotiation and Latin American reforms/elections are flagged as important trade and supply‑chain catalysts for Mexico and the region [p.3, p.15, p.17]. |
| MS - 2026 US Equities Outlook - The Rolling Recovery Is Here | Supply chains are being rewired via “region-for-region buildout” strategies, where corporates locate production closer to end markets to navigate tariffs and serve domestic demand, creating a structural tailwind for US industrial companies in a multipolar world [p.33–34]. Reshoring is explicitly labeled a structural positive for the US industrial sector after 20+ years of stagnation post-China WTO entry [p.34]. |
| Stifel Outlook | n.a. |
| TRowe Outlook | Global trade has been “reasonably adaptable” to tariffs, with supply chains progressively diversifying, and ex‑China emerging market stocks seen as beneficiaries of increased global supply‑chain diversification amid ongoing trade tensions [p.4–5, p.9]. Japan, at the core of semiconductor and robotics supply chains, and European industrial/automation franchises are identified as key beneficiaries of the AI‑related and reindustrialization capex cycle, effectively placing them among the regional winners from supply‑chain rewiring and “physical AI” buildout [p.9]. |
| UBS Year Ahead | Supply‑chain diversification and tech‑capex build‑out are key supports for Asia, with China, Japan, India, and ASEAN hubs such as Singapore benefiting from an expanded build‑out of technology supply chains, domestic upgrades, and a revival in regional credit growth, which in turn favors banks and consumer‑related sectors [p.23, p.31–32]. China’s strategy emphasizes domestic upgrades and resilience amid global uncertainties, while positive AI capex developments across Asia ex‑Japan underpin constructive equity views, indicating that the region is a major beneficiary of global supply‑chain rewiring even as US–China tensions persist [p.23, p.25, p.32]. The geographic pattern of winners—Asia tech hubs and infrastructure‑focused Europe—suggests a partial regional re‑balancing of production and capex rather than wholesale reshoring to the US [p.23–25, p.27–28]. |
| Source | Content |
|---|---|
| Goldman Outlook - Summary | Sector winners from the current geopolitical and industrial-policy backdrop include defense, utilities, and financials in Europe, which led value outperformance in 2025 and are supported by higher security and infrastructure spending [p.5], as well as AI, semiconductors, and broader strategic tech sectors in the US, Japan, and select EMs, underpinned by large AI capex and targeted fiscal support [p.3][p.7][p.8][p.17]. Eurozone tech and manufacturing sectors are under pressure from competitive Chinese exporters and rare earth export controls, indicating they are relative losers in this environment [p.18]. Key figures include the five largest AI hyperscalers accounting for ~27% of S&P 500 capex and deploying roughly 95% of operating cash flow to capex plus shareholder returns, supported by about $90 billion in debt issuance YTD 2025 [p.3][p.17]. |
| Brookfield Outlook | Beneficiaries include semiconductor fabrication, battery and robotics manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, advanced manufacturing, and associated processing, logistics, midstream and energy inputs—treated as infrastructure‑style opportunities tied to reshoring and AI [p.6–7]. U.S. manufacturing construction—rising from $72B (2018) to $232B (2024) with a 42% CAGR since 2021—illustrates the boom in industrial and manufacturing real assets, while industrial companies with underinvested, globally stretched supply chains are under pressure and turning to private capital for modernization and reshoring [p.18–19]. Logistics real estate and industrial land in key regions also benefit from trade regionalization and, in some cases, conversion to higher‑value uses like data centers when paired with power access [p.24–25]. |
| Blackrock Outlook | Key beneficiaries include European defense tech (supported by higher NATO and German defense budgets) and European utilities, which gain from energy-security and decarbonization-focused policy and capex; AI, automation and power-generation sectors in China, and broader EM themes tied to AI and the energy transition, are also favored. [p.10][p.14][p.16] |
| Goldman Outlook | Sectoral winners from the economic‑security and reshoring theme include defense (one of Europe’s fastest‑growing sectors), energy and LNG exporters, grid and power‑infrastructure providers, logistics/transport (rail, ports, storage), and circular‑economy and water/waste infrastructure companies that support resource security and resilience [p.9, p.37, p.45–47]. Pressure points include European tech and manufacturing segments that are being crowded out by highly competitive Chinese exporters and exposed to Chinese rare earth export controls, as well as firms reliant on long, cost‑only‑optimized global supply chains [p.28, p.45]. |
| Barclays Outlook | Beneficiaries include critical minerals and REE mining/processing (MP Materials, Lithium Americas, Trilogy Metals), domestic semiconductor fabrication (Intel), defence and cybersecurity, and energy/“Electrotech” infrastructure (renewables, grids, storage, nuclear) tied to AI and security, with notable numbers such as >US$2trn annual green energy investment, 126GW grid‑scale storage and 17m EV sales in 2024 [p.23–24], [p.36–39]. Losers or vulnerable segments are highly globalised exporters (especially in Europe under US tariffs), sectors reliant on cheap Chinese inputs, and more leveraged and cyclical credit issuers exposed to tariffs and weak consumers, as well as fiscally stretched sovereigns like France [p.6], [p.9–10], [p.20–21], [p.28]. Sectoral impacts are discussed qualitatively with some company‑level figures. |
| JPM Outlook | European defense manufacturers and broader domestic industrial “champions” are clear winners from pledged European defense and infrastructure spending of around 5% of GDP starting in 2026, while R&D‑ and capex‑heavy sectors (tech, health care, industrials, energy) benefit from U.S. tax incentives like full expensing and bonus depreciation that improve free cash flow [p.6, p.9]. Export‑oriented companies in Europe and Japan have been pressured by higher U.S. tariffs and stronger currencies, contributing to only low‑single‑digit earnings growth vs >10% in the U.S. in 2025, with expectations of a narrowing earnings gap as tariff uncertainty eases [p.8]. |
| JPAM Outlook | Clear sector winners include industrial and manufacturing real estate (especially high‑power facilities), logistics and transportation assets, domestic timber/wood producers, and energy infrastructure tied to renewables and grid upgrades, all benefiting from reshoring, energy security, and longer trade routes; for instance, high‑power industrial assets delivered ~8% returns vs <3% for lower‑power peers, and timber stands to gain from US blanket wood tariffs and EU bans on Russian imports [p.13, p.26, p.33, p.41–42]. Sectors and regions heavily reliant on old trade patterns—such as Canadian lumber exporters facing ~45% US duties, or Chinese construction and associated timber demand amid a prolonged housing slowdown—are under pressure, and credit-exposed companies facing tariff‑driven margin compression present elevated default and special‑situations risk [p.42, p.47, p.71–72]. |
| HSBC Outlook | Clear sector winners include US industrials and utilities linked to advanced manufacturing and data‑centre build‑outs, aerospace and defence firms benefiting from a targeted 5%‑of‑GDP defence‑spending path, cyber‑security providers facing USD 1.2–1.5trn in projected 2025 cyber‑attack costs, and clean‑energy and storage companies riding a doubling of global renewable capacity by 2030 and 23% CAGR in storage installations to 2035 [p.11–14, p.17]. Asian technology‑hardware producers, semiconductor‑related firms, power/grid suppliers, and AI/data‑centre infrastructure providers are also positioned as major beneficiaries of the AI capex and reshoring cycle, while European manufacturers—especially German autos—are pressured by high electricity costs and intense Chinese competition [p.9–10, p.13–14, p.20]. Global investment in advanced manufacturing facilities jumping from USD 2.5bn to USD 32.5bn YoY underscores the scale of opportunity for capital‑goods and related sectors [p.17]. |
| KKR 2026 Outlook | Clear sector winners include defense primes and related industrial suppliers (supported by $2.72tn global military spend and strong NATO/EU procurement), energy infrastructure and LNG producers (with U.S. gas demand rising from 113 to 138 Bcf/d by 2032 and LNG exports growing to 31% of demand), and asset‑based finance platforms that enable capital‑light models via large receivables and equipment portfolios [p.15, p.18–19, p.25, p.70–71, p.80–81]. European industrials, especially Germany’s capital‑goods exporters, face mounting pressure from China’s move up the value chain and redirected Chinese goods, compounded by higher European energy/carbon costs under ETS2, while goods‑producing sectors more broadly risk margin compression amid a “goods glut” [p.11, p.39–42]. Labor‑intensive manufacturing in the U.S./EU is both a beneficiary of reshoring demand and constrained by shortages of qualified workers, which could shift relative advantage toward firms that invest effectively in workforce training [p.16–17, p.18–19]. |
| RIC 2026 BAML | Industrials are positioned as prime winners from reshoring, AI‑related physical capex, infrastructure, and replacement of aged capital, supported by the outperformance of the American Industrial Renaissance Index (18%/ann. vs 14%/ann. Russell 3000 since 2012) [p.10, p.20]. Materials and Energy benefit from defense upcycles, underinvestment, and geopolitical risk premia, while Technology is labeled the “biggest victim of de‑globalization, tariffs, China‑exposure,” and Consumer Discretionary/Industrials face tariff and immigration‑policy downside risks; nuclear/uranium (URA, +86% YTD) is highlighted among structural beneficiaries of energy‑security geopolitics [p.10, p.14, p.18, p.20–21]. |
| MS - 2026 US Equities Outlook - The Rolling Recovery Is Here | Structural winners from the reshoring and industrial-policy regime include Industrials (multi‑industry/capital goods, Aerospace & Defense), Energy and power-related assets, select Consumer Discretionary Goods that gain pricing power from tariffs, Financials via increased capex and M&A, and domestically focused small caps tied to industrial and construction supply chains [p.8, p.15, p.20, p.25–27, p.33–35]. Losers or pressured groups include consumer goods segments disproportionately exposed to tariffs (e.g., softlines retail), although much of the tariff impact is judged to be already in estimates and partially mitigated, and there is broader downside risk to equities if tariff‑driven goods inflation forces Fed tightening [p.22–23, p.28–29]. Key figures include the current account deficit at ‑4.4% of GDP and the restoration of 100% bonus depreciation versus a prior 40% path in 2025, which drive sectoral capex incentives [p.9, p.20]. |
| Stifel Outlook | n.a. |
| TRowe Outlook | Sector winners from re‑shoring and industrial policy include industrials, materials, energy, and “physical AI” enablers (energy, cooling, networking, semiconductors), as well as aerospace and defense, which benefit from rising global defense spending and a long aircraft backlog [p.8–9, p.14–15]. Value stocks, financials, and small‑caps are expected to gain from deregulation, fiscal expansion, and re‑shoring, while eurozone manufacturing is pressured by the demand air pocket created by 2025 export front‑loading ahead of tariffs [p.3–4, p.9, p.15, p.17]. |
| UBS Year Ahead | Beneficiary sectors include industrials, utilities, and “European leaders” tied to infrastructure, power, resources, and longevity (benefiting from Germany’s infrastructure/defense push and EU Green Deal spending) as well as Asian technology and bank/consumer plays supported by AI‑related capex, tech supply‑chain expansion, and stronger regional credit growth [p.19, p.23, p.27–28, p.31–32]. Commodities and critical materials, notably copper, gain from both the energy transition and geopolitical supply constraints, while sectors sensitive to higher tariffs and persistent inflation face margin and valuation pressure as tariff‑driven price increases and potentially higher long‑term yields bite [p.19, p.33–34, p.47]. The discussion is largely qualitative and distinguishes sectoral tailwinds and headwinds [p.19, p.23, p.27–28, p.31–34, p.47]. |
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